In this paper, I discuss a Cheap Talk model that arises during the allocation of a limited budget to multiple Senders by a Receiver with private communication. The Receiver's utility is the sum of the utilities of the Senders. Considering quadratic utility functions, I show that there is no fully revealing equilibrium with budget constraint. I also show that a higher budget facilitates information transmission to the Receiver in terms of ex-ante expected utility by considering (1) an equilibrium where only one Sender reveals truthfully, (2) a symmetric equilibrium with two intervals and (3) a commitment strategy by the Receiver where only one Sender receives his desired amount. The commitment strategy is doing better than the other two types of equilibria for budget more than a particular value. This requires us to look for equilibria with higher number of intervals which does better than the commitment strategy.
Introduction
Many social and commercial organizations generally have different branches to deal with different issues. The organization frequently faces the decision of how much of the budget or of the resources to allocate to each branch. But as many organizations do not possess adequate wealth to give the desired amount of each branch, an organization faces a task of efficiently allocating its wealth to its branches which is the classical budget allocation problem. But each branch may like to get its best choice without caring about the whole organization by misreporting its desired need. This forms the basis of the Cheap Talk setting that I set to discuss in this paper 1 .
In the seminal paper Strategic Information Transmission by Crawford and Sobel (1982) [3] , the authors described a form of communication which is costless (Cheap Talk) between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver regarding the state of the Nature where the players prefer different actions for given states of the Nature.
The difference in preferences between the players (in other words the difference in biases) given the states of the Nature gives rise to strategic communication among players. Since then there have been numerous papers on different aspects of Cheap Talk. Gilligan and Krehbiel(1989) [6] , Krishna and Morgan [8] are the main works with multiple Senders in one-dimensional state space. The paper of Krishna and Morgan [8] also discusses about the sequential communication. Farrel and Gibbons (1989) [4] and Newmann and Sansing (1993) [11] discusses Cheap Talk with multiple Receivers.
Battaglini (2002) [2] , Levy and Razin (2004) [12] are some of the works on Cheap Talk in multiple dimensions state and policy space. Li (2003) [9] and Frisell and Lagerloef (2007) [5] discuss the Cheap Talk with uncertain biases. The paper by Gordon (2010) [7] discusses Cheap Talk in one dimensional state space between a Sender and a Receiver where the biases are state dependent. In this paper, the author has described an equilibrium with infinite partitions of the state space without truth revelation. Consider the manager (she) of a water Reservoir who wants to allocate water to two farmers (he), call them farmer 1 and farmer 2. The manager corresponds to the Receiver and the farmers correspond to the Senders in the Cheap Talk literature. The manager faces with a fixed amount of water to allocate between the farmers. Each farmer's need of water is his private knowledge. I assume that the farmers have quadratic utility
functions. This assumption is quite natural because a higher water than the requirement can cause flood or less water can cause drought. The manager here represents the society and hence her utility is the sum of the utilities of both the farmers. If there were no budget constraint, each farmer asks for the exact amount he needs and the manager allocates him the exact amount. But faced with a budget constraint, the manager may not allocate the required amount to each farmer. She allocates to each farmer that maximizes her utility within the budget limit and so each farmer gets a reduced amount. But then one farmer may not like to ask the exact amount he needs and will like to ask a higher amount given the other farmer is asking his exact amount and the Receiver believes both the farmers. This gives rise to strategic communication found in the Cheap Talk literature because the preferences (biases) of the players are different here, as discussed in Crawford and Sobel (1982) [3] . In my model, the biases depend upon what amounts the farmers need, that is the biases are state dependent similar to Gordon (2010) [7] . Also the bias depends upon how much budget is available, if there is sufficient budget, then there is no bias among players.
The paper by Mcgee and Yang (2009) [10] it is more probable that a Sender receives his required amount and hence the less he would like to deviate. I also consider a commitment strategy by the Receiver where she gives to one Sender his desired amount and the rest she gives to the other Sender depending on his need. I showed that this commitment strategy is doing better than the above two type of equilibria for a budget more than 1.05 and we have the question whether there is an equilibrium which does better than the commitment strategy.
When I discuss about future research in this model, I conjecture that there exists equilibria with higher number of intervals which does better than the commitment strategy of the Receiver. As budget increases, the number of intervals may need to increase to do better than commitment. I mention certain properties of the equilibrium with infinite intervals like at which point it converges and how the intervals are separated.
Even if the existence of equilibrium with higher number of intervals may be proved, the determination of the interval points remain challenging to calculate because in the indifference conditions, we may come across cubic equations.
The Model
Consider two Senders S 1 and S 2 and a Receiver R. Each Sender S i (i denotes both 1, 2) observes his state θ i ∈ Θ i = [0, 1]. The realization of θ i is drawn from a prior distribution F i with a cdf f i over Θ i . I assume that F i is a uniform distribution. Only S 1 observes the state θ 1 while only S 2 observes the state θ 2 . S i has to report a message m i to R about his knowledge of the state θ i . For simplicity, I assume that θ 1 and θ 2 are independent. Let y i ∈ R + (real non-negative numbers) be the action taken for the state θ i . The Receiver faces a budget constraint y 0 ∈ R + which says that y 1 + y 2 ≤ y 0 .
I assume that the value of y 0 is a common knowledge.
The utilities of the players are given by if the realized (true) states are θ 1 and θ 2 , 
To find the optimal action choice of the players in the states (θ 1 , θ 2 ) with the budget constraint y 0 , consider Figure 1 .
We are in the region EDF , the best choice for S 1 is y 1 = θ 1 , for S 2 is y 2 = θ 2 and for R is y 1 = θ 1 , y 2 = θ 2 .
Case 2 (θ 1 + θ 2 ≥ y 0 and θ 2 − θ 1 ≥ y 0 ):
We are in the region AEG, the best choice of R is y 1 = 0 and y 2 = y 0 , best choice of S 1 is y 1 = θ 1 if θ 1 ≤ y 0 and y 1 = y 0 if θ 1 ≥ y 0 , best choice of S 2 is y 2 = y 0 .
We are in the region GEF HB, the best choice of the Receiver is
, best choice of S 1 is y 1 = θ 1 if θ 1 ≤ y 0 and y 1 = y 0 if θ 1 ≥ y 0 and best choice of S 2 is y 2 = θ 2 if θ 2 ≤ y 0 and y 2 = y 0 if θ 2 ≥ y 0 .
We are in the region CF H, the best choice of R is y 1 = y 0 and y 2 = 0, best choice of S 1 is y 1 = y 0 , best choice of S 2 is y 2 = θ 2 if θ 2 ≤ y 0 and y 2 = y 0 if θ 2 ≥ y 0 .
Notice that as we increase y 0 from 0 to 1, the regions AEH and CF H decreases and the region EDF increases. As y 0 ≥ 1, there are only two regions where the region
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Figure 1: Best choices of the Players EDF expands to a pentagon and the region GEF HB condenses to a triangle and both the regions AEH and CF H vanishes.
If we write the above cases in compact form for all players, the Receiver's optimal actions choice in the states (θ 1 , θ 2 ) with the budget constraint y 0 is,
Optimal action choice (γ S 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 , y 0 ) of S 1 in the states (θ 1 , θ 2 ) with the budget constraint y 0 is,
Optimal action choice of γ S 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 , y 0 )) of S 2 in the states (θ 1 , θ 2 ) with the budget constraint y 0 is,
In Figure 1 , the best choice for R is O whereas the best choice for S 1 is the θ 1 -coordinate of E and the best choice for S 2 is the θ 2 -coordinate of F . There is a difference in the θ 1 -coordinate of O and E and hence there is a bias between S 1 and R which depends upon (θ 1 , θ 2 ). So the bias here is state-dependent as discussed in Gordon (2010) [7] . Similarly, there is a state-dependent bias between S 2 and R. For a given state (θ 1 , θ 2 ), the biases change if we change y 0 . When y 0 ≥ 2, the biases disappear for all the states.
Let the strategy of S i (here i denotes both 1, 2) be to choose a signaling rule (a probability distribution) q i (m i |θ i , y 0 ) for a given θ i ∈ Θ i such that
where q i (m i |θ i , y 0 ) gives the probability of sending message m i given θ i . The PBNE for this game is defined following Crawford and Sobel(1982) [3] , 
4. The off equilibrium path beliefs of R should be such that neither S 1 nor S 2 finds it profitable to deviate from the equilibrium path.
We can observe that, when there is no budget constraint or y 0 ≥ 2 and the realized states are θ 1 and θ 2 , there exists a PBNE in which the Senders report the true states i.e. S 1 reports m 1 which indicates the true state θ 1 , S 2 reports m 2 which indicates the true state θ 2 and the Receiver believes them and take the actions y 1 = θ 1 and y 2 = θ 2 so that all players attain their maximum utility zero. But the above PBNE may not be possible as we restrict y 0 below 2. We study the equilibrium when we introduce the
Remark 2.2 A PBNE always exists. There always exists a babbling equilibrium of this game like the classical Cheap Talk games where both S 1 and S 2 blabber and R does not believe the Senders and take actions according to his prior belief.
Consider S 1 sending a message with a signaling rule q 1 (m 1 |θ 1 , y 0 ) and S 2 sending a message with a signaling rule q 2 (m 2 |θ 2 , y 0 ). The Receiver's actions will be then,
The following lemma describes the optimal actions after hearing the messages and the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 2.3
where
No Fully Revealing Equilibrium
First we check whether with the constraint y 1 +y 2 ≤ y 0 < 2, a fully revealing equilibrium exists. A fully revealing equilibrium as defined in Battaglini (2002) [2] is an equilibrium in which for each Sender, for each of its state of the world, the information is perfectly transmitted, that is both the Senders reveal their states truthfully. Let S 1 report the true state m 1 = θ 1 , S 2 report the true state m 2 = θ 2 and R believes them. Optimal (3) and (4).
Given S 2 reports the true state θ 2 , the expected utility of S 1 by reporting the true state θ 1 is given at budget y 0 by,
Consider S 1 contemplating a deviation to increase his utility. Let S 1 inflates his message by which means in state θ 1 , he sends a message signaling θ 1 + . The expected utility with deviation is given at budget y 0 by
If EU S 1 ( ) − EU S 1 > 0 for some > 0 for a given θ 1 and y 0 such that + θ 1 ≤ 1, we can say that S 1 will find it profitable to inflate amount. The restriction + θ 1 ≤ 1 is kept to enable us to stay inside our message space M = [0, 1]. I show in the following lemma that there is no fully-revealing equilibrium for each y 0 ∈ (0, 2) by demonstrating that for each S i , there exists some state θ i ∈ (0, 1), such that S i finds it profitable to inflate > 0 (depends upon θ i ) amount, given the other Sender reports truth and R believes them. The proof is given in the appendix, in the proof I have shown it for S 1 and the same proof holds also for S 2 .
Lemma 3.1 There is no fully revealing equilibrium for 0 < y 0 < 2.
The intuition for the above lemma is that, the quadratic utility function decreases at a faster rate as we move farther from the ideal point (the peak) because of concavity.
For a Sender say S 1 , at a given state θ 1 , for higher states of S 2 such that θ 1 + θ 2 > y 0 the actions taken by R is far from the ideal point, here the ideal point is θ 1 . So S 1 prefers to send a message indicating a slightly higher state θ 1 + where > 0. Thus he will lose utility for lower states of θ 2 , but will gain substantially (due to concavity) for higher states of θ 2 even though the action moves closer to the ideal point less than amount. Also even if the cardinality of higher states is very small, still S 1 can choose very very small > 0 to increase his utility.
Interval Partition
Here I study whether we have interval partition, like the general Cheap Talk literature, of the state space of the Senders if they do not reveal fully in the equilibrium. In a one dimensional action space, the interval partition occurs if for messages m and m , the actions are y(m) and y(m ) respectively and y(m) < y(m ), then all the elements of the set A = {θ : q(m|θ) > 0} are less than any element of the set B = {θ : q(m |θ) > 0} and conversely if m(θ L ) and m (θ H ) are two messages from θ L and θ H respectively with
We can see that this makes the state space partitioned into intervals like Crawford and Sobel (1982) [3] .
Since the action space of the Receiver is multidimensional in our analysis, we can not use the above rule to see if we have interval partition of the state space of a Sender.
Instead of one action from a message, I'll use the average value of the actions (where the average is taken over the messages and the states of the other Sender) of one Sender to check for interval partition. 
Similarly, the function v(m 2 ) of S 2 by sending a message m 2 given the messaging rule If it can be proved that this rule is satisfied in our model, then we can say that the state space of S 1 is partitioned into intervals in the equilibrium. The same way we can prove also for S 2 and I just focus the proof for S 1 in the following analysis.
The set M 1 ( similarly M 2 ) contain messages such that each message have been sent with positive probability for some θ 1 ( respectively θ 2 ) in the equilibrium.
As defined above Ψ 1 (m 1 ) = 1 0
denotes the expected value of the state θ 1 after hearing a message m 1 where P (θ 1 |m 1 ) =
and m 2 1 be two different messages of S 1 .
The above lemma is quite straightforward because since Ψ 1 (m 1 ) is the expected value of the states from which the message m 1 has been sent, the message which signals a higher expected state induces a higher action from R for a given message of S 2 because of the utility function of R. Similarly, if v(m ). We shall use this lemma to prove the following lemma which states 11 that in our model we have interval partition. The proof is in the appendix and I want to remind again that all the proofs for S 1 holds for S 2 .
Lemma
3.4 If the messages m 1 (θ L 1 ) and m 1 (θ H 1 ) are from the states θ L 1 and θ H 1 respectively with θ L 1 < θ H 1 , then v(m 1 (θ L 1 )) ≤ v(m 1 (θ H 1 )). Conversely, if for two messages m L 1 and m H 1 , we have v(m L 1 ) < v(m H 1 ), then all the elements of the set A = {θ 1 |q 1 (m L 1 |θ 1 ) > 0} are less than any element of the set B = {θ 1 |q 1 (m H 1 |θ 1 ) > 0}. The above lemma holds because R updates his belief using Bayes rule after hearing a message and the continuity of the utility function of S 1 in θ 1 . We can conclude from this lemma that v(m(θ)) is monotonically increasing in θ where m(θ) comes from the equilibrium signaling rule.
Effect of Budget on Information Transmission
Here I show the effect of budget on information transmission with two types of equilibria given by: (1) Only one of the Senders reveals his state completely (2) Each Sender has two intervals. The information transmission is measured by the ex-ante expected utility of a player because with a finer partition of the state space, the ex-anted expected utility is higher as explained in Crawford and Sobel (1982) [3] . In our model, also for a given partition of one Sender, if finer is the partition of the other Sender, higher is the ex-ante expected utility. The ex-ante expected utility (EU ) of players for our model is given by following Crawford and Sobel (1982) [3] ,
Similarly, the ex-ante expected utility of S 2 (we denote it as EU S 2 ) is defined and the ex-ante expected utility of R (we denote it as EU R ) is the sum of the ex-ante expected utilities of S 1 and S 2 i.e. EU R = EU S 1 + EU S 2 .
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Equilibrium where One Sender Reveals Fully
We have seen before in the Lemma (3.1) that both the senders can not reveal their states completely. Consider S 2 sending messages with a signaling rule q 2 (m 2 |θ 1 , y 0 ) where 
where x is the greatest integer less than or equal to x.
The partition satisfies the condition
and actions of R are given by
The above lemma is quite simple to understand because given S 1 sends the true message θ 1 , the condition
≤ y 0 − 1 ensures that we are always inside the budget because,
is the maximum amount S 2 receives and the maximum value of θ 1 = 1 and so we should have 1 + 
{2} × {2} Symmetric Equilibria
Here I analyze the PBNE where each Sender partitions his state space into two intervals. I consider the symmetric equilibria and limit my analysis for y 0 ≥ 1 to keep the calculations simple. As the end points of any interval partition is always 0 and 1, so in the {2} × {2} symmetric equilibrium, a 0 = b 0 = 1 and a 2 = b 2 = 0 (in our notations a 0 always denotes the higher end of the interval which is 1). Hence, we just need to find the point a 1 = b 1 which is given in the following lemma and the proof is given in the appendix. The ex-ante expected utility for y 0 ≥ 1.5 is given by,
For the Receiver EU R = EU S 1 + EU S 2 = − 
With Commitment
In the previous two types of equilibria I discussed the effect of budget and showed that a higher budget increases information transmission. Here I discuss a commitment strategy of R and compare the ex-ante expected utility with those of previous equilibria.
Consider again 1 ≤ y 0 ≤ 2 and the Receiver with the commitment that she gives to one Sender say S 1 always what S 1 wants and then the rest she gives to S 2 based upon S 2 's need. I calculate the ex-ante expected utility for this case and they are given in the following lemma and the proof is given in the appendix. Here also, with a higher budget, there is more information transmission which can be seen in the Figure ( .
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Comparing the Ex-ante Expected Utilities
Consider Figures (3) and (4) where we have plotted the ex-ante expected utilities of the above three cases. The {2} × {2} symmetric equilibrium does not do better than the equilibrium where one Sender fully reveals for 1.5 ≤ y 0 < 2. The {2} × {2} symmetric equilibrium does better than with commitment strategy for 1 ≤ y 0 ≤ 1.05 (1.05 is the approximate value). But the commitment strategy does better than the two types of equilibria for 1.05 ≤ y 0 < 2. This comparison tells us to look for a PBNE for 1.05 ≤ y 0 < 2 which does better than commitment. Receiver where the Receiver represents the society (sum of the Senders) whereas each Sender cares for himself only. I showed that with a budget constraint, there is no fully revealing PBNE. I showed the effect of budget with a {2} × {2} symmetric equilibrium, with an equilibrium where only one Sender reveals truthfully and with a commitment strategy where R gives to one Sender his desired amount. I compared the ex-ante expected utilities of all these three cases and I showed that the commitment strategy is doing better than the other two cases for 1.05 ≤ y 0 < 2.
Here, I discuss if there is an equilibrium which does better than the commitment. I conjecture that there exists equilibria with large number of intervals (depends upon the budget) of the state space for both the Senders which does better than commitment. In fact we may take different number of symmetric intervals and for lower y 0 , small number of symmetric intervals may do better than commitment strategy, but as y 0 increases, we may need to take large number of symmetric intervals to do better than commitment.
I have not yet proved the existence of an equilibrium with infinite intervals nor even of equilibria with more than 2 intervals which is left for future research. It may be shown that a symmetric equilibrium with N + 1 intervals has ex-ante expected utility greater than the symmetric equilibrium with N intervals, so an equilibrium with infinite symmetric intervals is better than other symmetric equilibria. Therefore, I'll discuss certain results now that point to the existence of an infinite equilibrium and I discuss some properties of the equilibrium assuming it exists.
First I start with a lemma that states that the difference between the expected value of the states and the average value of the actions is higher for higher expected value of the states in any PBNE. This lemma I'll use to show that there is a converging sequence of the length of partition intervals if there exists a PBNE with infinite partition.
This lemma is intuitive because for a given message Let θ 1 = arg max
The following lemma describes that the length of partition intervals decreases from right side (from 1 on the θ 1 axis) and converges to the point θ 1 in the infinite equilibrium.
Since there are intervals of the state space, we have two messages m 
If there are infinite intervals of the state space Θ 1 in the equilibrium, then for θ 1 ≥ θ 1 , interval points converge to θ 1 which implies there will be truth revelation for
Let a grid of state space Θ = Θ 1 × Θ 2 be given by a partition of state space θ 1 by a 0 = 1, a 1 , a 2 , ..., a i 3. There is a set of equilibria where both the state spaces have infinite intervals.
The interval points of state θ 1 converge to a = min{max{0, y 0 − class of equilibria may be proved using the lattice theory approach adopted in Gordon (2010) [7] . Regarding whether these type of equilibria does better than commitment, I think equilibrium with both the state space having large number of intervals (depends on y 0 ) may do better than commitment. However the computation of the interval points are particularly difficult. Because first the indifference conditions are cubic equations in a i and b j . Second how to choose in which regions of the state space the
or 0 or y 0 as there are so many possibilities, but all may not give feasible solutions. Otherwise, we may use some numerical techniques to consider for different number of symmetric intervals, calculate the ex-ante expected utility and compare it with the commitment strategy and in this way it may be that for higher y 0 , we may need to take larger number of intervals to do better than commitment.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma (2.3) Proof To find the optimal solutions of the optimization problem (2) that precedes the lemma, consider the following optimization problem, max
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To maximize, we take derivative with respect to y 1 and y 2 and equaling to zero,
The last equality is because f 1 (θ 1 ) and f 2 (θ 2 ) are independent and q 1 (m 1 |θ 1 , y 0 ) and
The last equality is again due to the fact that f 1 (θ 1 ) and f 2 (θ 2 ) are independent and q 1 (m 1 |θ 1 , y 0 ) and q 2 (m 2 |θ 2 , y 0 ) are independent.
If the above optimal solutions satisfy y 1 + y 2 ≤ y 0 then it is the solution to the Receiver's optimization problem, otherwise we consider the following optimization problem which will give the solutions to the optimization problem.
Taking derivative with respect to y 1 and equaling to zero and using the fact that f 1 (θ 1 ) and f 2 (θ 2 ) are independent and q 1 (m 1 |θ 1 , y 0 ) and q 2 (m 2 |θ 2 , y 0 ) are independent,
But as 0 ≤ y 1 ≤ y 0 , the optimal solutions are,
To find equation (10), use different cases of equation (9). The above solutions can be seen as the optimal actions of the Receiver if the true states were the solutions to optimization problem (5). If we write in compact form of both the cases of optimal solutions y 1 + y 2 ≤ y 0 and y 1 + y 2 ≥ y 0 , the solution is given by similar to equation (1),
Proof of Lemma (3.1)
Proof : Case 1 : 0 < θ 1 < y 0 , 0 < y 0 < 0.5
Let's choose an very small such that θ 1 + < y 0 .
, the above term is always positive and hence deviation is profitable.
Case 2 : 1 − y 0 > θ 1 ≥ y 0 , 0 < y 0 < 0.5
Let's choose an very small such that θ 1 + < 1 − y 0 .
The above term is always positive and hence deviation is profitable.
Case 3 : 1 − y 0 ≤ θ 1 < 1, y 0 ≤ 0.5
Let's choose an very small such that θ 1 + < 1.
The above term is positive as if we take <
and so a deviation is profitable.
Case 4 : 0 < θ 1 < 1 − y 0 , 0.5 < y 0 < 1
The above term is positive for <
and hence deviation is profitable.
Case 6 : y 0 ≤ θ 1 < 1, 0.5 ≤ y 0 < 1
Case 7 :
This is the maximum utility that can be obtained and hence deviation is not profitable.
So we have analyzed all cases and proved the stated lemma.
Proof of Lemma (3.3)
Proof : It can be easily proved using the formula for optimal action given in equation (3) for all possible cases.
If Ψ 1 (m Proof of Lemma (3.4)
We have taken the strict relation because for some
The above relations imply θ Proof : Notice that for y 0 ≥ 2, both the players will tell truth as I have said before. So we focus on 1.5 ≤ y 0 < 2 and the condition why the limit 1.5 has been set will be clear later. Given the Senders' strategies, the best actions of the Receiver are y 1 (θ 1 , m 2 , y 0 ) = where x denotes the greatest integer lower or equal to x. For each 1 ≤ N ≤ N (y 0 ), we can describe a partition and the partition points can be calculated as done above. Notice that as y 0 < 1.5, then N (y 0 ) = 0, but it is impossible as the minimum value of N is 1 which means there is no partition. So we have considered y 0 ≥ 1.5. The other way of looking at it is if S 1 tells truth and if S 2 does not send any information (he blabbers), then the best action for R is to take y 2 = 0.5 which will require at least y 0 = 1.5 when θ 1 = 1. respectively. So the points to calculate the actions of R that we consider are, ( ). Let (x, y) be any point. The optimal action of R in the direction of θ 1 which is y 1 can be any of 0, y 0 , x− x+y 2 and x and similarly the optimal action of R in the direction of θ 2 which is y 2 can be any of 0, y 0 , y− . For 1 ≤ y 0 ≤ 1.5, the feasible solution is given by the actions as follows: for (
